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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeffrey E. Thies appeals from the district court’s order summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2010, a driver called 911 to report that people were fighting and yelling
in another vehicle. See State v. Thies, Docket No. 38869, 2012 Unpublished
Opinion No. 753 at p.1 (Idaho App., December 4, 2012).

The driver further

reported that his car window had been struck by objects that were thrown out of
the other vehicle’s window.

See id.

Shortly thereafter, officers located the

vehicle in a high school parking lot and detained Jeffrey Thies and another
individual.

See id. at pp.1-2.

Before the officers arrived, two teenaged

passengers of the vehicle entered the school. See id.
An officer ran a background check on Thies and discovered that his
driving privileges were suspended. See id. at p.2. The officers called for a
narcotics detection dog to come to the scene. See id. The dog alerted on Thies’
vehicle. See id. The officers then searched the car and discovered marijuana,
methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. See id. The state charged Thies
with trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, possession of
drug paraphernalia, destruction of evidence, and two counts of felony injury to
child. See id.; see also Idaho Data Repository, State v. Thies, Ada County Case
No. CR-2010-16988.
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Thies filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his car on the
ground that the officers unlawfully extended the duration of his detention to allow
time for a drug detection dog to arrive. See Thies, 2012 Unpublished Opinion
No. 753 at p.2. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion. (R., pp.118157.) After the subsequent trial, the jury found Thies guilty of all six charges. (R.,
pp.177-183.) The district court imposed a unified 15-year sentence with three
years fixed for felony trafficking in methamphetamine and concurrent jail
sentences on the remaining charges. (Id.)
In 2014, Thies filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.4-10.) The
district court appointed counsel to represent Thies on the petition. (R., pp.92-96,
102-103.) Appointed counsel did not file an amended petition.

(R., p.192.)

Thies asserted, among other things, that his appellate counsel was ineffective
due to counsel’s heavy caseload and for failing to “produce discovery of evidence
in full.” (R., pp.5-6.) While Thies did not expressly allege ineffective assistance
of trial counsel in his petition, he appeared to attempt to raise issues relating to
his trial counsel’s performance in some of his supporting affidavits and other
documents submitted to the court, and during the hearing on the state’s motion
for summary dismissal of the petition. (R., pp.14-18, 81; Tr., p.11, L.12 – p.20,
L.15.) Specifically, Thies appeared to assert that his trial counsel was ineffective
for: failing to adequately represent him during the motion to suppress; failing to
adequately investigate the case; failing to make certain evidence available to
Thies; and failing to make certain objections during trial. (Id.)
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The district court granted the state’s motion to summarily dismiss the
petition. (R., pp.212-225.) With respect to the ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claims, the court concluded that Thies failed to allege or present facts
demonstrating that he was prejudiced by any of his appellate counsel’s allegedly
deficient performance.

(R., pp.216-220.)

While the district court did not

expressly construe Thies’ petition as raising any ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims, it stated in its dismissal order that Thies failed to adequately
support any such claims with admissible evidence, and failed to allege prejudice
with respect to any such claim. (R., p.217.)
Thies timely appealed.

(R., pp.226-230.)

Although the district court

appointed counsel to represent Thies on the appeal (R., p.233), the Idaho
Supreme Court later granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw from the
case (9/15/15 Order). Thies proceeds pro se.
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ISSUE
Thies states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Thies[’]
petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel, i.e., that the effectiveness of counsel was not
prejudicial to Mr. Thies[’] case[?]
(Appellant’s brief, p.1.):
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Thies failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in his postconviction petition?
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ARGUMENT
Thies Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing
His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims Raised In His Post-Conviction
Petition
A.

Introduction
Thies contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in his post-conviction petition.
(See generally Appellant’s brief.)

However, Thies has waived his appellate

claims by failing to assign specific error to the district court and by failing to
support his claims with argument or authority. In the alternative, a review of the
record supports the district court’s conclusions.
B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).
C.

Thies Has Waived His Appellate Claims By Failing To Assign Specific Error
To The District Court And By Failing To Support His Claims With Argument
Or Authority
It is a well-settled tenet of appellate review that the “party alleging error

has the burden of showing it in the record.” Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 156
Idaho 37, 320 P.3d 428 (2014). It is equally well-settled that the appellate court
will not review actions of the district court for which no error has been assigned
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and will not otherwise search the record for unspecified errors.

State v.

Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983). Moreover, “[a] party
waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument are lacking.” State v.
Freitas, 157 Idaho 257, 267, 335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)).
In this case, the argument section of Thies’ Appellant’s brief reads, in its
entirety:
The district court emphasizes the latter of the two (2) prong
test in Strickland v. California, and Idaho v. Mitchell[] cited in [its]
Order Dismissing Petition as it pertains to prejudice. It should be
obvious to the court that ineffective assistance of counsel in a
hearing on a motion to suppress evidence is for all [intents] and
purposes prejudicial. Therefore, the appellant-petitioner cannot
derive any other conclusion than no evidence equates to no
conviction.
(Appellant’s brief, p.2 (citations and emphasis omitted).)
Thies has thus failed to clearly identify his claims for appeal, assign any
specific error to the district court, or support any claim with argument or authority.
It is Thies’ burden to demonstrate, on a claim-by-claim basis, why some alleged
district court error requires reversal of the order of summary dismissal.
Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 159, 657 P.2d at 23 (appellate court will not search
record for unspecified error). Therefore, Thies’ appellate claims are waived, and
this Court should affirm the district court’s order summarily dismissing his postconviction petition.
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D.

Even If This Court Reaches The Merits Of Thies’ Claims, Thies Has Failed
To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act.

I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.

A petition for post-conviction relief

initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522,
164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550
(1983).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own
initiative, if the applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the
burden of proof.” Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190
(1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s
conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001);
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
Also, because the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the
event of an evidentiary hearing, summary disposition is permissible, despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for the court alone
will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. State v.
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Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008). That is, the judge in a
post-conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion for summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the
most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Id.
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 7-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by
specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of
counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903.
An attorney’s performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable ….” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988);
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
The two-prong Strickland test for ineffective assistance of trial counsel
also applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Baxter v.
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State, 149 Idaho 859, 243 P.3d 675 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Mintun v. State, 144
Idaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App. 2007)). In order to establish ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner has the burden of proving that his
counsel’s representation on appeal was deficient and that the deficiency was
prejudicial. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,
276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). Even if a defendant requests that certain issues
be raised on appeal, appellate counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise
every non-frivolous issue requested by the defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.
745, 751-53 (1983); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181
(1988) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-754). The relevant inquiry is whether there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would
have prevailed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); Schoger
v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 629, 226 P.3d 1269, 1276 (2010) (citing State v. Payne,
146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008)).
In this case, Thies appears to contend that the district court erred by
summarily dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in his
post-conviction petition. (See generally Appellant’s brief.) As discussed above,
it is difficult to decipher the nature of Thies’ claims from his post-conviction
petition and Appellant’s brief. However, even if this Court addresses the merits of
these claims, Thies has failed to demonstrate error.

A review of the record

supports the district court’s determinations.
With respect to Thies’ ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims,
the district court properly concluded that Thies failed to allege facts which, if true,
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demonstrated prejudice with respect to his allegations that appellate counsel was
overworked, failed to provide him with certain evidence, and failed to raise certain
issues on appeal.

(R., pp.216-220.)

While appellate counsel stated, in the

context of an affidavit supporting his motion for extension of time to file Thies’
reply brief, that he was working under a heavy caseload (R., pp.60-62), the Idaho
Supreme Court granted counsel’s motion for an extension of time (R., p.63).
Therefore, there was no identifiable prejudice. Further, Thies failed to specifically
argue or provide any other evidence demonstrating he was prejudiced by either
his counsel’s heavy caseload, Thies’ alleged inability to personally access certain
evidence during the appellate process, or by appellate counsel’s strategic
decisions pertaining to which appellate claims to raise. Thies has therefore failed
to demonstrate that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claims.
With respect to Thies’ ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, the
district court first noted that “a fair reading of [Thies’] claims does not suggest
that his claims are against trial counsel.” (R., p.217.) However, the court further
noted that at the hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal, it
appeared that Thies “may also suggest error by his trial counsel for incorrectly
characterizing the investigatory stop as a ‘traffic stop’ and by failing to
investigate.” (Id.) The court properly concluded that Thies “[did] not explain what
should have been investigated or how the alleged mischaracterization or new
evidence would have changed the outcome of the case.”
supports the district court’s determination.
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(Id.)

The record

Thies failed to raise any specific

argument or submit any admissible evidence suggesting that trial counsel’s mere
reference to Thies’ police contact as a “traffic stop” constituted deficient
performance or somehow resulted in prejudice.

Thies also failed to clearly

identify any particular type of additional investigation his trial counsel should have
undertaken, and failed to attempt to argue how such an investigation and
resulting hypothetical evidence would have changed the outcome of his motion to
suppress or subsequent trial.1
Thies has failed to allege facts, which if true, indicate that he was entitled
to relief on any of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Thies has

therefore failed to show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing this
claim.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
order summarily dismissing Thies’ petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 17th day of February, 2016.

/s/ Mark W. Olson__________________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

1

Should this Court construe Thies’ Appellant’s brief as raising any additional
issues, the state adopts the arguments set forth by the state in its motion for
summary dismissal (R., pp.108-113), and during the hearing on that motion (Tr.,
p.20, L.21 – p.26. L.22).
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of February, 2016, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
JEFFREY E. THIES
7031 HUMMEL ST.
BOISE, ID 83709

MWO/dd

/s/ Mark W. Olson_________________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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